jurisprudence has paradoxically produced an "end of history" in cases involving race 7 by reifying the notion of color-blindness and thereby consigning all the vestiges of racial thinking, benign or otherwise, to a distant and discredited past.
The racial history project of Justice Roberts 8 was revealed during his first term on the bench in a Texas redistricting case that struck down one congressional district in the state because it diluted the voting power of Latinos. In contesting the majority's opinion on this particular issue, Justice Roberts decried the decision for engaging in the "sordid business" of "divvying us up by race." 9 Although the same "sordid" history of Latino vote suppression and a long entrenched patterns of political, social, and economic discrimination against Latinos, as well as Blacks, was barely mentioned by either the majority or dissenting opinions in the case, 10 Justice Roberts's striking statement established the frame by which his Court would evaluate the history of racial progress for cases involving race.
The logic and thereby the problems of the Roberts Court's understanding of the history of race relations were demonstrated most recently MAN (1992) , both Heller and I argue that the Supreme Court has embraced a history that celebrates racial progress, while ignoring altogether how in and in what ways that history fails to explain substantive changes in the ways in rich racial discrimination is practiced and experienced. Romero, The Tri-Ethnic Dilemma, supra note 7, at 854-855; Heller, Shelby County, supra note 7, at 376-385. In another essay, Heller describes all of the ways that "history still matters," in at least Voting Rights litigation. Joel Heller, Subsequent History Omitted (2014) THE CIRCUIT. Nov. 2014 Paper 64, at 380-381, available at http://scholarship. law.berkeley.edu/clrcircuit/64.
8.
A compelling narrative of the role that race and its history has played in the Roberts Court and a broader understanding of this as a "project" to transform constitutional jurisprudence is detailed in MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CON-STITUTION, Part 1, chs. 1-6 (2013).
9. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
10.
This history is documented in Nina Perales, Luis Figueroa & Criselda G. Rivas, Voting Rights in Texas: 1982 Texas: -2006 , S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. (2006) . Data compiled for the report relied on the archival research of noted historians, such as David Montejano, Julie Leininger Pycior, and Guadalupe San Miguel, Jr. Id. at 8-13, nn. 12-45. The majority opinion in Perry does reference the "sordid history of manipulating the electoral process to perpetuate its stranglehold on political power . . ." 548 U.S. at 449.
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The Keys to Reclaiming 419 in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder. 11 Writing for the majority, Justice Roberts declared aspects of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 unconstitutional because it relied on "decades-old data and eradicated practices," reflecting only "decades-old problems" that have "no logical relation to the present day." 12 The problem, according to Justice Roberts, was that Congress had been using statistics derived from its coverage formula from the mid-1960s and early 1970s as a benchmark for identifying which jurisdictions would be subject to Section 5 of the VRA, a provision requiring the submission of any proposed change in voting policies to the federal government for approval before implementation. 13 The coverage formula was unconstitutional, according to the Court, because it failed to recognize that "things have changed dramatically" in the covered jurisdictions, most of which were located in the South. 14 In making this argument, Justice Roberts claimed that there was "no denying that . . . our Nation has made great strides" when it came to the issue of racial equality. 15 Justice Roberts referenced particularly the elimination of " [b] latantly discriminatory" acts that included not only a "variety of [requirements and] tests 'specifically designed to prevent' African Americans from voting," but also the elimination of murder and police beatings of civil rights activists. 16 The result was a narrative that described a 21st century United States that has thrown off many, if not all of the shackles of its racial past. As a consequence, the Justice declared that Congress needed to adapt the legislation to address "current needs" and "current conditions." 17 This Article is designed to re-frame and thereby re-claim the ways that the Roberts Court thinks and subsequently writes about the history of race relations in its decision making. Indeed, it takes seriously his suggestion in Shelby County that legislatures, judges, lawyers, and citizens understand better the "current conditions" 18 of racial discrimination in the United States. I argue that the Roberts Court's telling about the history of race in the United States deploys an outdated and myopic binary framework to understand how racial inequality has been and continues to be enforced through both overt and covert means. To be sure, the framework that the Roberts Courts embraces is powerfully rooted in notions of American exceptionalism whereby the United States is a uniquely free na-tion committed to liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire or market based economics. 19 Racial discrimination-particularly its manifestation and conscious codification against Blacks through a violent, brutal and oppressive system of slavery and Jim Crow-however, has been the tragic exception to these principles. 20 In order to reconcile such dissonance, the Roberts Court in its race cases has told a story of enlightenment whereby Americans, much like the prisoners in Plato's Allegory of the Cave, emerge triumphantly out the dark, dank, debilitating, and "sordid" cave of racial consciousness. 21 For the Roberts Court, history serves the same rhetorical tool as it did for Plato to describe an upward trajectory from color-consciousness to color-blindness in the United States. Whereas the Roberts Court opinions in race cases, especially those by the Chief himself, have referenced a distain for slavery, Jim Crow, and racial violence, it has done so by decrying race-conscious thinking. By arguing that all racial thinking has created shadows of racial discord and racial hostility, the Roberts Court instead celebrated all of the progress that has been made to lift Americans and its legal system out of its racist past.
For the Roberts Court, the ascent out of the cave of racial consciousness is rooted squarely in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954. 22 (1996) . In 2007, Justice Roberts gave the Keynote Address for The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies National Lawyers Convention. Displaying his historical sensibility, Justice Roberts' remarks focused on the judicial appointments of James Madison as the "architect of limited government and separated powers" dependent upon an "independent judiciary". Justice John G. Roberts, Keynote Address at the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies' 2007 National Lawyers Convention (Nov 16, 2007) (transcript available at http:// fora.tv/fora/fora_transcript_pdf.php?cid=1967) (Broadcast available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CRISpBGsoTOU).
20.
The historian Gary Gerstle has described the tension between "civic nationalism" -the American belief in the fundamental equality of all human beings, in every individual's inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and in a democratic government that derives its legitimacy form the people's consent[;]" and that of "racial nationalism" -that "conceives of America in ethnoracial terms, as a people held together by common blood and skin color and by an inherited fitness for self-government. that Brown encapsulates has, for Justice Roberts certain "undeniable" truths. 24 One is the "fact" that racial classifications, whether used to segregate students or advance diversity "promotes notions of racial inferiority," and "lead[s] to a politics of racial hostility." 25 The second truth is that racial consciousness "reinforce[s] the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin." 26 And finally, racial consciousness "endorse[s] race-based reasoning and the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict." 27 Brown's history, the Court tells us, "should teach greater humility" about how the shroud of any racial thinking would inevitably lead to harm. 28 It is critical to point out that the "undeniable" harms associated with race based thinking that the Court cites emerge out of Burger and Rehnquist Court jurisprudence that largely involved white plaintiffs challenging racial classifications. In those cases, history was deployed by each court to make the claim that racial classifications designed to harm non-Whites in the history of the United States are no different than racial classifications designed to benefit non-Whites. 29 Both, according to the Court, effectuate a harm on the "disfavored" group. In other words, the Court was indicating that the history of racial discrimination against Blacks and other non-Whites, though rooted in different contexts, had value only in suggesting that Whites might suffer the same harm. As Justice Roberts made evident in his majority opinion in Parents Involved:
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in these cases have not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once again [ Brown also represented unambiguously the harms of racial consciousness. Rooted in "Southern" racial attitudes-from the forced and violent enslavement of Africans and African Americans, to the state-sanctioned Jim Crow segregation of Black children and families in many urban locales, to the massive resistance by many Whites to court ordered integrationBrown highlighted for many the fallacies and dangers of racial thinking. 32 To be sure, the racial attitudes of the South have played a decisive role in the racial history of the Roberts Court. In another Voting Rights Act case that would anticipate the Court's direction in Shelby County, the Roberts Court had similarly proclaimed that " [t] hings have changed in the South." 33 In this case and Shelby County, the discussion surrounding Section 5 made the faulty observation that Section 5 applies only to the South, failing to recognize that coverage extends to jurisdictions in states such as New York, Arizona, and South Dakota. 34 By making this argument, the Roberts Court also strongly suggested that outside of the South, no explosive history of race relations or racial discrimination existed beyond racial thinking only designed to disadvantage Whites. 35 Subsequent "fidelity" of the Roberts Court to the racial history symbolized by Brown and all of the "change" that occurred thereafter in the South signified how much Americans had emerged from the cave of racial consciousness 36 to become post-racial in its decision making. 
34.
As Heller pointed out, "[t]reating the nine Southern states covered in whole or in part by Section 5, which stretch from the Rio Grande Valley to the Louisiana bayou to the Appalachian Mountains and contain millions of people, as a single entity is fallacious." Heller, supra note 7, at 359. n. 4
35.
See discussion on the use of race in the Seattle School District and discussion of the harms of such racial consciousness by the School Board, supra notes 26-31.
36.
Siegel, supra note 5, at 9-10; see also Guinier, supra note 32, at 114.
37.
See, e.g., Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1594 (2009) (arguing that "post-racialism in its current iteration is a twenty-first-century ideology that reflects a belief that
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The Keys to Reclaiming 423 Within twenty years of the Brown decision, however, judicial deployment of history predicated on its basic factual premises had become increasingly anachronistic. Indeed, the same binaries in Brown that had long served to explain race relations such as Black-White, North-South, and Urban-Rural were giving way to massive demographic transformations in the United States. 38 This was a nation that in the years and decades after World War II had become multi-cultural and multi-lingual; 39 where people from around the world were moving in unprecedented numbers to the "New West" and "New South;" 40 all of whom would settle to live and work in sprawling and segregated metropolitan spaces. 41 All of the familiar tropes so clear in Brown and its progeny-southern Jim Crow segregation, poor Black families living in burnt-out urban communities, separate and altogether unequal treatment in housing, employment, and public accommodations 42 -could no longer accurately describe the post-World War II history nor the current reality of shifting and transforming patterns of race relations in the United States.
In order to reclaim the history of race from the Roberts Court, I advocate for a re-centering of the Court's racial histories around, and greater fidelity to, a case that more accurately represents the recent history and current status of race relations today: Keyes v. School District No. 1. 43 As due to the significant racial progress that has been made, the state need not engage in race-based decision-making or adopt race-based remedies.").
38 See infra note 103. The notion of the "New West" and the "New South" as part of a greater whole was explored by the historian Carl Abbott in "New West, New South, new Region: The Discovery of the Sunbelt" in Raymond A. Mohl ed., Searching for the Sunbelt (1990 Part II of this Article accordingly examines the many ways that Keyes pointed to a new metropolitan geography of color-blind multi-color racial segregation in the United States. As Section A surveys, a broad and diverse array of local, state, and federal government actions reconfigured the ways in which American's experienced and were impacted by race. Through housing and transportation policy, land use laws, and strategic use of local government controls, American's came to live in largely homogenous suburban communities, thereby evading altogether the social mix and inequalities of their sprawling metropolitan regions. This new metropolitan geography spatially reinforced the perception among largely White suburban communities that racial problems defined by Northern and Southern racism were a thing of the past.
44.
See On the other hand, the fragmentation and isolation of metropolitan America obscured the extent that the nation's traditional geographical and racial sensibilities of North and South, Urban and Suburban, and Black and White were being fundamentally transformed. As Section B explores, this transformation has occurred along two paths. The first has been driven by immigration from Latin America, Asia, and Africa, and the ways that racialized individuals from these groups emerged to claim space and place in these very same metropolitan regions.
The second path revolves around those same suburbs that had effectively prevented integration for decades after World War II. As metropolitan areas grew, suburbs emerged as some of the most integrated areas in the United States, but also revealed a troubling pattern of re-segregation and incidents of racial violence along multiple color lines. In the process, immigration law and criminal law worked together to create legal and social conditions that were remarkably similar to the Jim Crow ordinances that perpetuated racial discrimination and unequal treatment against African Americans after the Civil War.
The history I subsequently tell about race in the post-World War II United States requires the Court to recognize that the nation's racial history was not fully forged in the South, nor was it transformed for the better upon decisions like Brown or legislation like the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The myopic racial history of the Court suggests neither colorblindness nor the rise of post-racial idealism. Rather, race relations throughout the United States, particularly after World War II, have been in a state of flux and dramatic transformation. While the Roberts Court has consistently deployed history to describe a United States dissociated from the insidious effects of racial change and transformation, I offer a historical frame that points to race's enduring and malleable condition. History is not about the shadows of then, but the terra firma of now. constitution had specifically prohibited the use of race in the assignment of students to its public schools. 50 In spite of Colorado's anti-discrimination constitutional provisions, racism ran deep in the state. In the first decade of its founding in the 1860s, for instance, American Indians were massacred and displaced from their native lands. 51 During the 1920s, the Ku Klux Klan had a major influence in Colorado (particularly in Denver).' 52 In the 1930s, explicit anti-Mexican sentiment by the Governor and the state's citizens resulted in the National Guard being deployed against largely Mexican Americans and documented Mexican migrants. 53 And through much of the first seven decades of the 20th century, practices by realtors, parents, school boards, and politicians created widespread residential racial segregation, while actively working to prevent integration in and outside of schools. 54 Coloradoans had long struggled to circumvent equality provisions and civil rights protections under state law. 55 Second, when eight Black, Latino, and White families filed suit against the Denver public school board and its administration on June 19, 1969 for perpetuating an unconstitutional practice of segregation, 56 "they entered uncharted waters of the nation's post-Brown school desegregation 50 
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The Keys to Reclaiming 427 jurisprudence. As a result, the Justices were confronted with the challenge of determining how to measure racial segregation and inequity in a public school system where the city's largest and most impoverished group were Mexican Americans." 57 According to Justice Brennan, this posed a challenge because, unlike cities in the American South, "Denver is a tri-ethnic, as distinguished from a bi-racial community." 58 Understanding how discrimination worked in such an environment would require a varied and sophisticated analysis of history, social context, and other factors not evident in the "bi-racial" cases. 59 In a United States that was experiencing a dramatic shift in immigration from Latin America and Asia, Keyes highlighted an emerging tri-ethnic, or more accurately, multi-color, order. 60 The Supreme Court's resolution of such issues promised to change dramatically how the Court would understand and address racial discrimination. As Justice Powell summarized:
The situation in Denver is generally comparable to that in other large cities across the country in which there is a substantial minority population and where desegregation has not been ordered by the federal courts. There is segregation in the schools of many of these cities fully as pervasive as that in southern cities prior to the desegregation decrees of the past decade and a half. The focus of the school desegregation problem has now shifted from the South to the country as a whole. Unwilling and foot-dragging as the process was in most places, substantial progress toward achieving integration has been made in Southern States. No comparable progress has been made in many nonsouthern cities with large minority populations primarily because of the de facto/de jure distinction nurtured by the courts and accepted complacently by many of the same voices which denounced the evils of segregated schools in the South. But if our national concern is for those who attend such schools, rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history 57.
Romero, How I Rode the Bus, supra note 44, at 1026. The only other case involving all three groups that was filed during the same time period was Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, 324 F. Supp. 599, 604 (S.D. Tex. 1970). That case, arising in Texas, involved a district that was largely "Mexican-American," but also included "Anglos" and a small number of "Negro" students. Cisneros. 324 F. Supp. at 608 n.37. rather than present reality, we must recognize that the evil of operating separate schools is no less in Denver than in Atlanta. 61 For this reason, Justice Powell saw the case as an opportunity to "formulate constitutional principles of national rather than merely regional application." 62 Finding such constitutional principles, however, would be much easier in theory than in practice. For the first time since it had rendered its decision in Brown, the Supreme Court could not find unanimous consensus in its school desegregation jurisprudence. 63 Indeed, the splits on the Keyes Court reflected the challenges subsequent courts would have in grappling with how racial discrimination actually worked in non-Southern contexts. 64 For the reasons that will be described in the following sections, the history that Keyes reflects tells us much more precisely than Brown those "undeniable truths" about the nature, scope, and trajectory of race and racism in the modern United States.
A. The New Metropolitan Geography and the Rise of Post-Racial Colorblindness
By the time the Supreme Court rendered its Keyes decision in 1973, the United States was in the midst of what urban historian Jon Teaford describes as a "metropolitan revolution" in American Culture and life. 65 Whereas in the years immediately before the Brown decision, the United States was an "urban nation, dominated by clearly defined urban places with an anatomy familiar and comprehensible," by the 1970 and 1980s it had become sprawling, decentered, and-spatially as well as culturallyfragmented metropolitan regions. 66 In the period from Brown in 1954 to Keyes in 1973, most of the nation's urban centers were losing population to suburbs and "independent" municipalities that initially formed a perimeter around center cities. 67 Of significance is what these new metropolises-especially the new suburban developments in locales like Denver at the heart of the Keyes case-would mean for race-relation issues. To be sure, such places seemed a universe away from the "urban crises" tearing "rust belt" cities in the Northeast and Midwest, 72 and also different from the Southern cities and towns with their massive resistance to the African American civil rights. 73 One reason for this is that suburbs emerged from their inception as racially homogenous and politically isolated communities. 74 Almost exclusively White and solidly middle-class, suburbs created what Matthew Lassiter calls the "ascendance of color-blind ideology" that fuses "class-based individualism with color-blind innocence." 75 These suburban residents were not strict segregationists like George Wallace or card-carrying members of the Klu Klux Klan, but instead they fundamentally believed that their pursuit of the "American Dream" was "the product of meritocratic individualism rather than unconstitutional racism." 76 69.
For a broad historiographical examination of these trends as well as their influence on social, political, and economic life, 
72.
The two classic statements of the urban crisis remain ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO 1940 -1960 (1998 Indeed, in conjunction with decisions such as Brown and Baker v. Carr 77 in 1962, grand legislative enactments such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 reinforced the belief that subsequent racial and economic segregation in American society was not the product of any overt state-sanctioned racial project. 78 Once formal barriers were removed, so the thinking went, all Americans would be free to act in a color-blind way. 79 As I have argued elsewhere, "[p]ost-racialism and [the ideology of] color-blindness thus became the same side of the same coin that would fund [a racially fragmented metropolitan landscape]. Consumption and meritocratic individualism, not race, would be the only organizing principle determining where one lived, worked, played, raised families, and sent one's children to school." 80 As historians of the post-World War United States have documented, one's own decisions about where to live, build a home, raise a family, and send one's children to school were not made in isolation. 81 Rather, these cumulative decisions were intricately connected with federal, state, and local housing, municipal and county government, land use laws, and policies that both exacerbated and furthered enduring patterns of racial residential segregation. 82 Lassiter, in his history of the "silent [suburban] majority" argues that these policies naturalized color-blindness because they "did not require individual racism by suburban beneficiaries in order to require White class privilege and maintain barriers of disadvantage fac-77.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (enabling federal courts to intervene in state redistricting schemes that diluted and minimized the impact of the African American voter). This case allowed the Court in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) to establish the "one man one vote" principle in how representation to state houses and legislatures would be apportioned.
78.
LASSITER 
82.
Romero, The Spatialization of (Color)Blindness, supra note 38, at 968-83.
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The Keys to Reclaiming 431 ing urban minority communities." 83 The aggregate effect of such behavior was to create a metropolitan landscape of profound racial design. One contemporary astutely observed the insidiousness of postracialism: "New municipal buildings, new roads and highways, urban renewal, and public playgrounds and parks . . . seem[ ] to present means by which a segregation-minded community can improve [its] municipal facilities, while achieving the intended elimination of Negroes in certain areas." 84 Part and parcel of a larger system of White supremacy that shifted dramatically by the 1960s, "the unexceptional" and "mundane" acts of local, state, and federal governance-from paving streets to financing suburban tracts homes-remade Jim Crow in innocuous and insidious ways. 85 Keyes powerfully reflects these metropolitan trends and changes in America's racial history. One of the great assumptions of so-called Northern school desegregation suits was that the state or local governments in those locales never engaged in formal projects of racial discrimination or segregation. Especially in the urban and metropolitan West, cities such as Denver were viewed as relative racial utopias. 86 Nevertheless, the seemingly innocuous revision of attendance boundaries by the Denver school board revealed only one of the many insidious ways that white supremacy was maintained by local and state governments in these ostensibly postracial locales. 87 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 20:415 Brown and subsequent cases and legislative acts that struck down obvious and evident forms of racial discrimination was not the end of the nation's troubled history with race. Instead, it was the beginning of a massive restructuring of race relations and oppression that depended on a color-blind metropolitan geography. Because metropolitan areas like the one in Keyes were not seemingly burdened with the sins of the biracial South, color-blindness made racial difference for the majority of those living in new, but nevertheless insulated, insular, and unconnected suburban communities a relic of the past. This was a past, however, whose biracial premises could neither contain nor account for the multicolor present that were shaping metropolitan America.
B. Tri-Ethnic Transformation and the Old Juan Cuervo and New Jim Crow in The Multicolor Metropolitan Landscape
When the Supreme Court observed in Keyes that Denver was triethnic, it recognized that the familiar Black-White binary for understanding the causes and thereby the consequence of race was inadequate for understanding racial segregation in the Denver school district. 88 More than just a case about Denver, however, the Court's observation reflected an emerging multi-color reality that would directly challenge the color-blindness embedded in the metropolitan landscape. A key component of this challenge was the Hart Cellar Immigration Act of 1965. 89 Passed at precisely the same historical moment as the momentous civil rights legislation dismantling Jim Crow, the Act dramatically changed patterns of migration to the United States, and in so doing, cemented the "modif[ication of the nation's] racial map . . . that that been marked principally by the contours of white and black and that had denoted race as a sectional problem." 90 According to the historian Mai Ngai, "[i]mmigration law was part of an emergent race policy that was broader, more comprehensive and national in scope." 91 For many historians, immigration law has long served to produce racial categories with pernicious racial outcomes. 92 and mov[e] directly to the suburbs." 99 As I have noted elsewhere, Latina/ os, Asians, Pacific Islanders, and African Americans, as well as African immigrants and their children "began to settle in large numbers in those same suburban communities that had effectively excluded them during the second half of the twentieth century." 100 Finding older but affordable housing stock in the suburbs built between the 1950s and 1980s, 101 more communities of color have come to live in the suburbs than in core cities. 102 Collectively, this has effectuated a profound transformation in how we understand the racial demography of a nation where 85% of the nation's immigrants and 77% of the nation's minority population live in metropolitan regions. 103 The consequence is that "[t]he historically sharp racial and ethnic divisions between cities and suburbs in Metropolitan America are more blurred [now] than ever." 104 Nevertheless, increasingly multicolor suburbs are experiencing profound racial tensions and dislocations in familiar ways. Nothing demonstrates this more than the recent history of Ferguson, Missouri, the St. Louis suburb at the heart of the shooting death of the African American man Michael Brown by a White police officer, Darrin Wilson. 105 106 As the population became older and poorer over time, non-Whites, particularly young African Americans moved into the suburbs. Whereas Ferguson was 85 percent White in 1980, by 2014, Whites represented less than thirty percent of the city. 107 Although Blacks comprised a clear majority of the population, Moreover, over policing and mass incarceration has not tracked the familiar Black-White binary of race relations. Latinos in general and Mexicans and Mexican Americans, in particular, have been "demonized as a grave threat to the American culture, society, and the economy; . . . systematically excluded from rights privileges and protections extended to other Americans; and . . . subject to increasingly harsh and repressive enforcement actions that drove them further underground." 116 In the last decade alone, thousands of local municipalities and state governments have taken immigration enforcement into their own hands by deputizing local sheriffs to enforce federal immigration law, penalizing employers, landlords, and almost anyone who has business dealings with an immigrant. 117 Such local and state authorities have also colluded with the federal government to create what legal scholar César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández has dubbed the emblems of crimmigration law; whereby noncitizens and citizens alike, especially those from Latin America, are conceptualized as "criminal deviants and security risks," and "people to be feared." 118 As with the "color-blind" criminal justice system documented in Alexander's study, once a Latino is labelled "illegal," the "old forms of discrimination-employment discrimination, housing discrimination, denial of the right to vote, denial of educational opportunities, denial of food stamps and other government benefits, and exclusion from jury service- The Keys to Reclaiming 437 are suddenly legal." 119 It is no surprise that this occurs in metropolitan areas where Joe Arpaio in suburban Maricopa County Arizona, Joe Barletta, the Mayor of Hazelton Pennsylvania, and Steve Levy, the Suffolk County Commissioner in Long Island New York became "overnight celebrities" for their virulent and oftentimes vicious crackdown on immigrant communities. 120 To be sure, the spate of anti-immigration legislation passed by local municipalities (especially those in the suburbs) 121 and states since 2005 has led many commentators to label such restrictions-and the racial animus behind it-as Juan or José Crow. 122 As I and others have shown, this is not a new phenomenon, but one directly related to ways that Latinos have been racialized since the early decades of the 20th century. 123 In other words, the new Jim Crow is really the old Juan Crow for Latinos who have long been affected by the racialized tensions inherent when local and state governments exercise their most disciplinary powers of sovereignty (policing) subject to the most minimal standards of judicial review (immigration law). Suburbs have thus become multi-color flash points. Blacks justifiably rally against racial profiling and disparate targeting. 124 Latinos navigate record numbers of deportations and overt questions about their citizenship, work status, and right to live in the United States. 125 Asian Pacific Islanders
